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It is characteristic for the commercial systems of the ancien regime 
colonial empires that even purely economic variables, such as the volume 
of trade, commodity prices, o r the direction and composition of com­
modity flows, appear strongly influenced by the political regulatory 
fram e constructed by metropolitan governments and their colonial 
administrations. It is thus not surprising that in the historiography on the 
trade to and within the Spanish Indies so much emphasis has been 
placed on the regulatory policies of institutions as the Consejo de Indias, 
the Casa de Contratación and the Consulados in Cádiz, Mexico and 
Lim a. Particulary for the late colonial period a good deal of attention has 
been focused on that body of royal laws, ordinances and decrees which 
apparently brought such sweeping changes not only on the trade, but 
also to the fiscal and administrative structure of Spanish America and 
which is commonly referred to as the Bourbon reforms. Only during the 
last fifteen years has there grown a substantial body of studies on 
economic and social aspects of Spanish American commerce during the 
late colonial period. Only since the late 1970’s do we posess thorough 
quantitative studies on the trade between Spain and Spanish America 
during the last century of the colonial regime. Only since the publication 
of Brading’s innovative study on miners and m erchants in Bourbon New 
Spain have we begun to get a glimpse of the mercantile and credit 
practices among the commercial elite of that viceroyalty, as well as its 
social recruitm ent mechanisms, problems which have typically remained 
unexplored for the case of Peru until the just completed work of Flores 
Galindo and H a itin .1 Even for the better studied M exican viceroyalty 
many issues concerning the late colonial commercial structure rem ain 
obscure: W hat was the pattern of transport, its cost and the degree to 
which it allowed the rise of an integrated market covering the core of the 
viceroyalty? T o which degree was trade competitive or, conversely, con­
tinued to rely on clientelistic monopolization of commodity and credit 
markets? How did mercantile interest rates develop? Did their evolution 
influence investment decisions?
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W hile shifting the focus away from institutional histories, much of 
the recent economic and social historiography on late colonial commerce 
does not escape the spell of Bourbon policy making: Spectacular increases 
of trade volumes are explained as consequences of comercio libre, the 
rise of new groups of traders and the relative decline of others are de­
scribed as the result of lifted trade monopolies or the establishment of 
comercio neutral. In short, the power of the Spanish crown to effect 
changes in the economic and social structure looms large in most of these 
studies.
T he three papers to be discussed here, as different as they are in 
methodological approach, in scope and contents , share this trait: They 
use particular Bourbon reform  measures or other political events for 
periodizing changes in commercial patterns and the composition of the 
m erchant communities. Barbier approaches his topic from  the perspective 
of modern political history, tracing an evolving commercial policy­
making process on the basis of the conflicting interests bearing on it. 
Flores Galindo looks at the operation of L im a’s mercantile aristocracy 
primarily from  the point of view of the social historian, while H aitin 
approaches the same city’s commerce with its overall economic structure 
foremost in his analysis.
It is clear that these papers, demonstrating the broad range of issues 
now being researched in the area of Spanish A m erica’s late colonial 
commercial structure -  from  policy -  making to price history -  , hardly 
in and of themselves facilitate a comparison of the two viceroyalties’ 
trade pattern. W ith the overall purpose of this volume in mind, I shall 
thus begin with a critique of the three individual papers and then 
attem pt to outline some m ajor points for a comparison of New Spain’s 
and P eru ’s late commercial structures.
In his paper on the policy struggle over H ab an a’s right to re -  export 
European goods to V era C ruz, a struggle which spanned most of the 
reign of Charles IV , Barbier lucidly presents another facet of his general 
model for Spain’s colonial policy evolution during the twenty years 
between C harles’ III death and the dram atic events of 1808. By 1807 the 
royal finance and colonial administrations in M adrid were ready to 
pursue a policy, which singlemindedly tried to maximize fiscal revenues, 
even if this upset the longstanding fram e of colonial commercial policy 
and thus might be prejudicai to entrenched and hitherto powerful mer­
cantile interests. For the specific issue studied by Barbier here, this 
m eant allowing La H ab an a’s m erchants the re -  export of European 
commodities to V era C ruz, so that receipts from  this potentially rich
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trade would obviate the need for hefty amounts of Mexican crown silver 
flowing to C uba as situado instead of aiding M adrid’s treasury in the 
fight against mounting deficits. But such a policy shift, according to the 
author, also spelled the death of the coalition of interests, constitutive for 
the Bourbon reform era, between the crown and M adrid interests on the 
one hand and the Cádiz Consulado and coastal Spain’s mercantile 
interests on the other.
M uch of this conflict over La H ab an a’s role in the Spanish em pire’s 
colonial structure during the reign of Charles IV  has been studied 
previously in the literature.^ T he value of B arbier’s contribution here lies 
in his emphasis on the strong link between commercial and monetary 
issues, in identifying particular interests with both sides in the policy 
debate and in deftly placing these developments, concerning a single 
issue, within the broader fram e of M adrid ’s colonial policy between 1788 
and 1808.
I would like to suggest two lines of critique to B arbier’s argum ents, 
one concerning the significance of species shortages in late eighteenth 
century C uba and the other dealing with the alignment of interests which 
had an impact on M adrid’s po licy -m ak ing  process.
C uba’s species shortage had two causes: 1. the different intrinsic 
value of the currency which its merchants and bureaucracy received from 
New Spain from  that of its m ajor trading partners, Spain and the 
United States and 2. the rapid development of the island’s sugar 
industry between 1792 and 1808. A fter the clipped coinage which had 
stimulated the island’s exports, had been called in by the mid -  1780’s, 
the strong M exican pesos began to circulate since the early 1790’s. These 
coins immediatly flowed out again, because both U .S. and Spanish 
merchants could make speculative profits on exchanging them  for gold or 
Spanish pesetas. This was a condition which could not even be halted by 
a positive balance of trade with foreign areas and indeed continued to 
characterize C uba’s currency situation until the mid -  nineteenth 
century.3 It is true that the negative balance of trade with ’’foreign 
colonies,” particulary the United States, also caused coinage to flow out 
from  the island. But this negative balance of trade, as Barbier has 
pointed out, was a necessary side effect of the extremly rapid expansion 
of C u b a’s sugar industry after St. D om ingue’s collapse as m ajor 
producer. This expansion was enthusiastically pushed by La H ab an a ’s 
m erchant community, and while planters became ever more endebted for 
lack of own funds for the acquisition of slaves and agricultural imple­
ments required to increase their sugar production, the H abaneros, both
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merchants and prestamistas, were the main beneficiaries in this ’’take off” 
period for C u b a’s plantation economy. They were willing to supply 
credit to the planters against payment in sugar as long as the market 
promised high returns and expanded. In this way the rapid growth of 
sugar production was underwritten by massive investments of m erchant 
capital in C uba from diverse sources, as the peninsula, New Spain and 
even the United States.4 This infusion of capital probably did as much 
as the crown situado to compensate for the island’s negative balance of 
trade. Since the high rates of imports into the island was in good 
m easure a direct gauge of m erchant investors’ confidence in the further 
growth of the Cuban sugar economy, it is obvious that the H abaneros 
could live with the negative balance of trade and the consequent shorta­
ges of species.
T heir political pressure to liberalize species and trade flows between 
the island and V era C ruz should thus not be seen prim arily as an 
attem pt to find replacement for the declining situado specie entering 
C uba. R ather it aimed at strengthening La H ab an a’s (and thus the 
m erchants’own) commercial and financial centrality, to transform  the 
port into ”el almacén general, el emporio de éstas Am éricas,” as the 
sindico of the city’s newly created Consulado, Arango y Parreño, 
declared.5 O f course the H abaneros hoped to take in more Mexican 
currency with gaining the privilege of selling European goods in New 
Spain. But this increased am ount of currency was m eant to sustain the 
expansion of both exports and imports from and to C uba, a function of 
pum p priming, one might say, for the further growth of the island’s 
sugar industry. This process would continue to produce negative balances 
of trade, and the H abaneros, through these very trade deficits, would 
further fortify their control over the island’s economy.
W ith regard to the interests which had a bearing on M adrid’s deci­
sion making over trade between C uba and New Spain, it would appear 
that Jaques Barbier may have downplayed the combined voice of New 
Spain’s Consulados -  united on this issue inspite of their otherwise 
fierce rivalry -  and the colony’s viceregal administration, something 
carefully documented by Ortiz de la T ab la .6 Between 1797 and 1799, 
when the question of European re -e x p o r ts  from  H abana to V era Cruz 
was first debated, interests of the Mexico and V era C ruz Consulados 
coincided completely with those of Cádiz. M adrid’s policy must have 
been aimed as rauch at not alienating New Spain’s m erchant guilds, a 
key power group in this centerpiece and most valuable revenue source of 
Spain’s American empire, as it was at maintaining a balance between
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crown (fiscal) and coastal commercial interest in the peninsula itself. 
While the growing pressure of fiscal issues clearly had a strong impact 
on the 1807 policy change , one may wonder, whether the desire to keep 
New Spain as closely integrated into the em pire as possible, did not play 
an equally im portant role. A fter all, in 1807 the alternative for M adrid’s 
policy makers was not whether Mexico was to be provisioned with 
European goods only from peninsular ports or also, by way of re­
exports, from  La H abana. R ather, in the face of the metropolis’ inca­
pacity to keep up regular trade with America, the only realistic options 
consisted in making La H abana the entrepot for neutral ships arriving 
with European goods for the M exican market, or seeing the viceroyalty 
supplied completely by direct links between foreign ports and V era Cruz. 
U nder prevailing circumstances granting La H abana a privileged status 
in transatlantic commerce did not only legalize a de facto trade pattern 
established at least since 1805, but also offered the only, albeit feeble, 
possibility to limit direct access to New Spain’s market by foreign m er­
chants. O ne may also wonder to which degree changes in the pattern of 
commerce during the w ar years had strengthened the position of those 
merchants in V era C ruz and the interior of New Spain (especially in the 
intendancy of O axaca), who openly favored re -e x p o r ts  from  La 
H abana (Ortiz de la T abla only views these as minor ’’defections” from 
the opposing view of New Spain’s Consulados).
O ne final comment on periodization: For Barbier the royal decree of 
1807 signalled the abandonm ent of the commercial policies of the Bour­
bon reform  era, thus pushing the political turnabout, at least in this 
issue, nearly to the very end of Spain’s ancien regime. It is ironic that 
on the question of trade between La H abana and V era C ruz Barbier 
should identify the position, which helped to m aintain the interests of the 
Consulados of Cádiz, Mexico and V era C ruz on the basis of commercial 
regulations from  the seventeenth century, contained in the Recopilación 
de Leyes de Indias of 1687, with the Bourbon reform  policy, while he 
attaches the abandonm ent of that policy to a m easure liberalizing trade. 
If nothing else, this suggests that the peculiar mixture of Spanish 
aggrandizement and enlightened reform  characteristic of C harles’ III 
commercial policy some fifteen years later through the rapid turn  of 
events had been converted into a last line of defense for the most 
powerful m erchant groups in the peninsula and New Spain. T he fiscal 
crisis and the disruption of transatlantic commerce which resulted from 
the Napoleonic wars, was producing a strange coalition between m er­
cantilist bureaucrats in M adrid, who were reducing their political projects
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to the immediate welfare of the Spanish state in its hour of need, and 
’’dissident” merchants at various points in the em pire, who profitted from 
a further liberalization of trade. W hat then is to be gained from  the 
application of a common label ’’Bourbon reform s” to commercial policies 
evolved over more than forty years?
T he problems raised by Alberto Flores G alindo’s paper on the 
economic operations and the social dem eanor of L im a’s m erchant aris­
tocracy during the eighteenth century are of different nature. T he value 
of his contribution, part of a larger study, rests on providing us for the 
first time with information about the social, economic and political 
mechanisms by which the highest stratum  of L im a’s merchants attained 
and attempted to solidify wealth and power. W e now learn that in many 
aspects they operated much in the same way as those of other Spanish 
A merican cities in the Bourbon era: T he continuity of a fam ily’s com­
mercial operations was often assured by having a nephew from  the 
peninsula take over the business in Lima; exclusivity and social distan­
cing were pursued by endogamous m arriage patterns. But Flores Galindo 
tries to cover much vaster ground in his paper and touches upon as 
diverse issues as the articulation of various modes of production, the 
relation between ’’mercantile splendour” and the structure of the labor 
market, the ties between the merchants and the colonial bureaucracy, 
and commercial conjunctures. W hile very suggestive, the treatm ent of 
some of these issues raises more questions than it answers. W hat does it 
m ean, for example, to insist on calling L im a’s Consulado merchants 
both an aristocracy and the dominant colonial class? It is impossible to 
discuss all of these questions here. I shall limit myself to make a few 
remarks primarily on the author’s periodization scheme and his inter­
pretation of the effects of the commercial crisis of the m id -  1780’s, as 
well as some methodological problems.
Tim ing and nature of both the rise and the decay of what Flores 
Galindo views as the ephemeral wealth and power of L im a’s merchant 
aristocracy in the third quarter of the eighteenth century seem proble­
matic. His view that between the mid -  1630’s and the early decades of 
the Bourbon era a long break occurred in L im a’s mercantile penetration 
of the Andean hinterland, roughly coinciding with the phase of the 
seventeenth century crisis debated for many of the Atlantic economies, 
seems untenable. T he decline of silver production, which reached its 
nadir probably during the early decades of the eighteenth century, never 
lead to an abandonm ent of the credit and commodity circuits stretching 
from  Lim a to Potosí, Q uito  and places in between. Even the production
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of precious metals did not decline uniformly throughout the viceroyalty 
since the 1630’s and some mining regions, notably Puno, reached their 
apex precisely during the last third of the seventeenth century, pre­
sumably the nadir of the crisis.7 O ther activities, which presumed fairly 
large credit and commercial circuits, were either in their ’’take off” phase 
during the seventeenth century, as the repartos by corregidores, or 
reached their peak of production, as the Q uito  obrajes.8 T he Lima 
m erchants provided credit for such enterprises and were involved in the 
commercialization of the goods produced or sold in the Sierra. This is 
not to say that the crisis of the seventeenth century had no effect on 
L im a’s m erchant community and its control over the Andean hinterland. 
R ather the period between 1635 and the early decades of the eighteenth 
century witnessed a thorough restructuring process affecting both over­
seas trade and ties with the Andean hinterland: It was marked by a 
changing relative weight of transatlantic and domestic trade, by a dif­
ferent composition of European imports (cheaper grades of textiles 
beginning to asume greater significance since the later seventeenth
century), declining unit prices for European goods (m eaning that the 
im port capacity of the viceroyalty did not decline proportionate to the 
decline of precious metals shipments). Also during this period, what 
Sempat Assadourian has called the ’’Peruvian space”, i.e. that vast region 
which had been integrated into one, albeit precariously weak commercial 
network during the late sixteenth century through the rise of the silver 
mining complexes, for the first time began to shrink. This process 
continued in the later eighteenth century, as Flores Galindo observes, 
with the escisión of the Viceroyalty of La Plata and L im a’s consequent 
loss of control over Alto P eru ’s mines.
If this view of the period of crisis has any merit, then Flores Galin­
do’s idea about the ’’project” of L im a’s merchants during the eighteenth 
century requires serious revision: It was not that the creation of a m er­
cantile space in the Andean hinterland was ’’just beginning” during the 
Bourbon era. R ather L im a’s merchants readjusted their methods of
penetration, the spatial patterning of their trade in the Sierra, and the 
type of goods they supplied.
But what about the effects of comercio libre for the city’s mercantile 
aristocracy? Did it really bring about a rapid decay of their "ephemeral 
splendour” after 1783? Flores Galindo here coincides fully with the con­
ventional view, as it was first suggested by the bitterly complaining
petitions and inform es of L im a’s Consulado during the 1780’s and
magisterially expounded by Céspedes del Castillo’s study on the relation
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between Lim a and Buenos Aires. To be sure, the glut of the market, 
produced by the first rush of liberalized trade after the peace of Paris, 
caused a grave short -  term  crisis and lead to the recomposition of 
L im a’s m erchant community.
But the author does not convincingly show that L im a’s merchants did 
not benefit from  the strong growth of imports at least until 1797, as well 
as the rise of P eru ’s silver production, which continued until the early 
years of the nineteenth century. Fisher has shown that it was the Lima 
merchants who, working through aviadores and repartos de bienes by 
subdelegados (although forbidden) reaped high profits in the expansion 
of silver production.®
Flores Galindo is certainly right, when he suggests that Lim a was 
loosing market shares in the trade of Chile, Alto Peru and even the 
southern Intendencies of Lower Peru itself. But this was occurring at a 
tim e when volume and value of European imports were rising fast. We 
thus need much better documentation to tell wether L im a’s trade in those 
regions was declining in absolute terms before 1810. At the same time it 
now appears likely that the sale of European goods in the remaining 
areas of the viceroyalty and particularly in Lim a itself, i.e. regions where 
L im a’s merchants still maintained an undisputed hegemony, was 
expanding at least until the mid 1790’s and thus compensated for any 
losses sustained in the South.
As Sergio Villalobos has shown more than twenty years ago, com­
plaints about ruinous gluts on the market, due to the effects of comercio 
libre, neutral ships since 1797, an increased presence of foreign m er­
chants and ram pant contraband, were not only uttered by L im a’s m er­
chant aristocracy, but just as often -  and with the same voice of des­
peration -  by the newly established m erchant guilds of Santiago and 
Buenos Aires, the beneficiaries of the Bourbon commercial reform s.10 
Since such complaints were raised simultaneously with a large expansion 
of trade, they cannot be used as evidence for a pervasive and lasting 
commercial decadence. R ather they demonstrate greatly changed condi­
tions of trade, under which merchants used to monopolies and privileges, 
saw their profit margins slashed as agile and at times highly capitalized 
competitors entered the market. As Flores Galindo has pointed out, 
under these circumstances quite a few of the monopolistic merchants 
succumbed in this brisk new business climate. But others survived and 
did well, either by adapting or by carving out a share for themselves in 
one of the niches in which good monopolistic profits were still to be had, 
as for example trade and credit operations with the burgeoning silver
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mines through aviadores. At the same time new fortunes were made by 
the very m erchants who entered the market only after the liberalization 
of the trade between the late 1770’s and the 1790’s. Such m erchants or 
companies, both peninsular and creole, at first operated independently of 
L im a’s Consulado and were viewed as dangerous rivals. But by the 
second decade of the nineteenth century, they often had become res­
pected mem bers of the m erchant guild. T he largest fortunes existing in 
Lim a during that time, such as those of Pedro Abadia and José de 
Arizmedi, had been made since the 1780’s, i.e. the presumed beginning 
of decay.11 L im a’s mercantile aristocracy of the late eighteenth century 
thus would seem to have been much less of a closed, quasi corporate 
social stratum  than Flores Galindo assumes. It may very well be that the 
drastic changes in the viceroyalty’s commercial structure since the early 
1780’s forced this stratum  to allow fast rising new merchants to join its 
ranks precisely at the moment when it had begun to close itself off as an 
exclusive aristocratic group.
Flores Galindo primarily uses two types of evidence to support his 
claim concerning the decay of L im a’s trade since the 1780’s: 1. a com­
parison of various data on merchants and their capital in wills from  two 
sample years, 1770 and 1810, and 2. a  variety of trade, tax and pro­
duction statistics contained in the literature on this period.
T he first source, the wills drawn up before Lim a notaries in 1770 
and 1810, raises the question, how much confidence we may place in 
this small sample. W ith a m erchant community num bering in the hun­
dreds, what does it tell us that ten or six m erchants respectively possess 
between 2500 and some 60,000 pesos in cash in the two sample years, 
lying more than a generation apart? W hat share of a m erchant’s total 
assets was held as liquid cash in his strong box at any given moment, 
and how much was invested in merchandise or circulating as credits? 
Also the range of credits which Flores Galindo found in the wills, up to 
2,200 pesos in 1770, seems low. W e know of quite a few loans by 
L im a’s m erchants to miners, for example, am ounting to more than 
10,000 pesos. For the purpose of analysing the fate of the Lim a m er­
cantile aristocracy, a more promising -  and not necesarrily more 
laborious -  research strategy might have consisted in tracing all notarial 
contracts pertaining to a few m erchant families over a period of forty or 
fifty years.
T he variety of statistics on trade, taxation and production which 
Flores Galindo cites from the literature, faces a double drawback as 
evidence for his argum ents. In the first place, several of these statistics
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allow rather different conclusions than those the author draws from 
them . It is true, for example, that the revenue collected by the vice- 
royalty’s caja matriz in Lim a declined somewhat after a peak in the 
1780’s. Nevertheless the mean receipts for every f iv e -y e a r  period 
between 1790 and 1820 continued to surpass the collection of any similar 
period before 1780, in most cases by as much as 50 to 100 percent.12 
Similarly it is true that the production of silver and gold coins in the 
Lim a mint reached its apex in 1794 and from then on stagnated. But the 
m ean annual mint production was slightly higher between 1796 and 1815 
than it had been in the preceding twenty -  year period.1"*
Secondly, the statistics on mintage, tax collection, silver production 
and new titles of nobility all show peaks at different points of time 
between the mid -  1780’s and 1804. For example the conferral of new 
titles of nobility peaked in the quinquennium  1790 -  94, and stayed at a 
comparatively high level during the following ten years. But Flores 
Galindo views the political administrative changes of the late 1770’s as 
m ajor causes for the decline of L im a’s monopolistic merchants. Thus 
one is left wondering when precisely this decay of L im a’s mercantile 
aristocracy set in.
M y comments on Alberto Flores G alindo’s paper owe much to the 
revisionistic notions about L im a’s late colonial economy developed by 
M arcel H aitin in his contribution to this volume and, in greater detail, in 
his recent dissertation. R ather than focus on one preem inent social strata, 
H aitin presents an interpretation of L im a’s overall economy between the 
1780’s and the outbreak of the W ars of Independence. Ju s t as Alberto 
Flores Galindo, he stresses the interm ediary position of the city between 
overseas trade and the Andean hinterland, but places more emphasis on 
L im a’s centrality as a market in its own right and the great significance 
of the bureaucracy (both civil and ecclesiastic) for its economy. T o my 
knowledge H aitin is the first author who manages to come to a balanced 
realistic assessment of L im a’s economy in the quarter century before the 
W ars of Independence, an assessment which comes to grips with the 
confusing evidence both for crisis or decline and continued buoyancy. H e 
does so by insisting on differentiated conjunctures for P eru ’s regional 
and sectoral economies, as well as on changes in the social distribution of 
benefits from L im a’s trade and industry. H aitin mostly agrees with 
Flores Galindo concerning the crisis of the city’s monopolistic merchants. 
At the same time he stresses two elements which provided new pros­
perity to certain groups of traders and artisans: the continued strenght of 
the viceroyalty’s mining production and the city’s population growth,
308
M y comments on M arcel H aitin ’s paper concern his explanation of 
price increases in connection with L im a’s population growth and his view 
about the distribution of mercantile capital since the 1780’s. Any one 
who has ever worked on Peruvian economic history knows the frustration 
which arises from  the absolute dearth of price data for any period prior 
to the late nineteenth century. H aitin ’s series on prices for agricultural 
commodities, carefully constructed from  hospital accounts, thus constitute 
a welcome tool. His findings on the gradual decline of sugar prices 
coincide fully both with qualitative studies on the crisis of late colonial 
P eru ’s sugar industry as well as with recently published price series for 
P o to s í.^  At the same time the author’s finding that prices for garden 
crops and cereals rose moderately between the 1790’s and 1818/19 raises 
some interpretative questions. His price series only cover a relatively 
short period, during which exogenous factors often may have distorted 
longfrange price trends. T hus we may wonder whether the lo n g - ra n g e  
growth of L im a’s population, underway since the 1746 earthquake, really 
constituted the main cause of these price rises. Prices for grains and 
tubers were also rising in Potosí between 1790 and 1810. T his rise, 
however, reversed a trend towards lower prices that began in the 
mid -  1750’s, inspite of population growth. T andeter and W achtel view 
climatic conditions as principal factor responsible for the renewed price 
increase after 1790.15 Also for H aitin ’s data on Lim a for key food crops 
such as potatoes and quinua the impact of climatic cycles on prices is 
discernible, inspite of the au thor’s claim to the contrary. For population 
growth to be the culprit behind rising food prices, it would need to be 
shown that the num ber of people in the market rose faster than agricul­
tural production. This was indeed what happened in Mexico since the 
1770’s. T he relatively slower growth of agricultural production than of 
population owed much to the fact that in the densely settled central parts 
of that viceroyalty most land apt for crop production had been put 
under the plough by the 1780’s .16 W hat little we know so fa r about the 
complex interrelationship between population, climate, production and 
social structure in the countryside of late colonial Peru does not suggest a 
similar development in the Andes: H ere the demographic recovery had 
set in too recently for the rural population to be pushing against upper 
limits of crop production under prevailing social and technological con­
ditions. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that the growth 
of agricultural production could not have kept apace with population 
growth -  as T andeter and W achtel suggest it did during the third
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quarter of the eighteenth century -  , if exogenous factors had not 
interfered.
Marcel H aitin makes much of the changed size distribution of L im a’s 
mercantile wealth since the 1780’s. Unquestionably the overall num ber of 
wholesalers, commission agents and shopowners was on the rise and most 
new practicioners only controlled very modest operations indeed. Neither 
do I wish to quarrel with the au thor’s assertion that during the market 
glut of the m id -  1780’s ’’hands of very limited means” tem porarily 
assumed a much greater weight in L im a’s commerce than previously.
I rem ain skeptical however, wether this constitutes enough evidence to 
diagnose a lasting dispersal of the city’s mercantile wealth for the 
rem aining thirty -  five years of the colonial era. Contem porary accounts 
purporting to witness such a dispersal are suspect, because a greater 
distribution of wealth among ’’industrious” small traders and artisans 
coincided with how an enlightened author would have wanted to perceive 
progress. In other words, reports about the growing well -  being of ever 
larger num bers of small traders may be just as much an expression of 
the general confidence of its author about the city’s economic develop­
ment as any accurate account on the distribution of its mercantile wealth. 
H um boldt’s often cited comparison between Lim a and Mexico may also 
very well have been skewed. Some four years after comercio libre was 
finally introduced in New Spain in 1789, Viceroy Conde de Revillagi- 
gedo described the changed commercial climate there nearly in the same 
way as we have heard it for Lima:
El que ésta nueva  especie de com erciantes va cada d ía  en  a u m en to  es u n a  
verdad tan  n o ta ria  que no  se a trev e rán  a negarla  los m ism os que aseg u ran  el 
com ercio decaído. Ellos dicen  que es excesivo el nú m ero  de efectos que v iene, 
y que se h a n  re tirado  de com erciar los sujetos de gruesos capitales. C o n q u e  es 
preciso que p a ra  d a r giro y salida a  las existencias se em pleen m uchos ind i­
viduos de corto c a u d a l.17
H um boldt may also have confused the larger absolute values of m er­
cantile wealth in Mexico with a greater degree of concentration.
A fter the regulatory reforms between the 1770’s and 1790’s the 
shopkeeper as well as the small trader attempting to sell European goods 
on his own account either in Lim a itself or in the Andean hinterland, 
was just as dependent on credit from the large import m erchant as 
Flores Galindo has described it for the earlier decades. No trader could 
survive one or two commercial slumps independently, if he did not 
possess enough capital to carry him  through a num ber of years during
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which his merchandise was not selling and his commodity loans were not 
being repaid. It would seem that the need for credit and hence fairly 
substantial commercial capitals was increasing in a business environment 
calculating with lower profit margins. In brief, the increased num ber of 
small traders since the 1780’s was merely an expression of the growing 
volume of trade. To determine changes in the rate of concentration of 
mercantile capital we would require evidence from  wills of a very sub­
stantial sample of m erchants and shopkeepers of different means and, 
probably a more precise measure, an analysis of almojarifazgo  accounts 
as to the num ber of im porting and exporting m erchants and their shares 
of the whole commodity flow over the last half -  century of the colonial 
era.
I would like to conclude by proposing some broad points of com par- 
ison between the structure and evolution of commerce in late colonial 
New Spain and Peru.
1. T he expansion of the Atlantic economies and the subsequent 
liberalization of Spanish commercial regulations had a more favorable 
effect on the trade of New Spain than on that of Peru during most of 
the eighteenth century. While in this period Peru suffered the escisión of 
vast territories from its commercial space, that of New Spain remained 
largely intact. T he volume of transatlantic and intercolonial trade to New 
Spain grew much more rapidly during the first six decades of the 
century than trade with Peru. As John  Fisher has recently shown, it 
appears that both viceroyalties participated equally in the expansion of 
trade during the 1780’s and 1790’s .18. In other words, the different 
volumes of maritim e trade to New Spain and Peru, as one might observe 
them  from  around 1800, had their origin in divergent trends early in the 
century and not towards its end. M exico’s commerce further benefitted 
from  growing European dem and for a num ber of its agricultural com­
modities, such as sugar, indigo and cochineal. Peru, due to its unfavor­
able location, hardly benefitted at all from this new demand. -  D uring 
the last dozen years before the outbreak of the W ars of Independence 
the m erchants of Mexico City and V era C ruz were probably affected 
more seriously by comercio neutral than were their colleagues in Lima. 
By 1806/07 a great part of European goods destined for New Spain 
reached the viceroyalty by way of the C uban entrepot. A similar threat 
posed by Valparaiso to the merchants of Lim a only became effective 
with the complete opening of trade to foreign vessels and merchants 
since the early 1820’s.
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2. While Peru suffered an external splitting of its commercial space, 
the trade liberalizations of the 1780’s and 1790’s lead to a decentrali­
sation of trade networks and commercial wealth within New Spain. This 
came to the fore most clearly with the foundation of the new Consulados 
of V era Cruz and G uadalajara in 1795; but the merchant communities 
in many other provincial centers, such as O axaca, Q uerétaro , San 
Miguel el G rande and León also showed increased vigour. T heir 
onesided dependence on the m erchants of Mexico City decreased. This 
decentralization lead to a stronger integration of the M exican market. No 
such development can be observed in the truncated viceroyalty of Peru. 
H ere the trade liberalization primarily lead to a changed social com­
position of L im a’s own m erchant community. But the m erchant com­
munities in most of the provincial centers, such as Cuzco, Arequipa, 
H uam anga and Trujillo, rem ained relatively weak, and their dependence 
on Lim a for the supply with European goods and credit diminished 
little.
3. While it was typical for merchants in both viceroyalties to divers­
ify their investments, the composition of their ’’portfolio” and, hence, 
capital flows between various sectors of the economy, differred notably 
during the late eighteenth century. In both viceroyalties merchants 
invested heavily into haciendas. But investment of mercantile capital in 
mines tended to be only short -  range and of limited scale in Peru, while 
in New Spain some of the huge fortunes in late colonial mining were 
made by members of M exico’s Consulado. For L im a’s merchants 
probably their investment in ships played a greater role than for those in 
Mexico City or V era Cruz. We are lacking data to compare mercantile 
investments in industry and urban real estate.
4. Given New Spain’s considerably larger population and her greater 
urban agglomerations, the northern viceroyalty’s market for most 
commodities obviously was considerably larger than that of Peru during 
the late colonial period. T o the degree that commercial structures were 
still shaped by privileges and monopolies, this favored a larger scale of 
commercial operations and hence a greater accumulation of mercantile 
capital in New Spain compared with Peru. T he closer links with mining 
enterprises just mentioned above may also help to explain the greater 
frequency of merchants with very great fortunes in Mexico. It should be 
noted that this need not be a sign of a greater concentration of men- 
cantile capital in New Spain, since most likely the base o f small and 
middling merchants was also correspondingly broader here. But the 
greater accumulation of capital may have had some repercussions for the
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economy at large, as in Mexico it must have been easier to gather large 
sums of money for new investment projects, say a new drainage shaft 
for a mine, than it was in Peru.
5. T he most difficult and at the same time most im portant issue 
concerns the market mechanisms, or the economic organization of trade 
in both viceroyalties. While at the highest level, the import of European 
goods, there is, for both viceroyalties, much evidence for increasing 
competition among merchants since the 1780’s, it appears that the arti­
culation with the sphere of production continued to rely heavily on 
coercion, monopolization and on privileges. For the case of Mexico there 
even exists good evidence to suggest that those extending credit towards 
small Indian and mestizo producers -  not only traders, but also miners, 
hacendados and crown officials -  strengthened their position during the 
last third of the eighteenth century, as currency became scarce inspite of 
growing mining output. At the same time circulation of commodities 
and credit between merchants, crown officials and other ’’respectable” 
businessmen became more agile through the widespread use of bills of 
exchange. In Mexico, then, a cleavage may have developed during the 
late colonial period between trade mechanisms used among the middle 
and upper strata of society on the one hand and those mechanisms 
applied by traders and officials to the lowest strata of rural and urban 
society.
In Peru, on the other hand, the abolition of repartos produced a 
decline of coercive trade practices towards the Indian rural population. 
At the same time, the basic conditions of domestic trade -  dispersal and 
isolation of population nuclei, low level of production and income, 
continued importance of forced labor regimes -  favored monopolistic 
trade practices even more than in Mexico. It is thus not surprising that 
the growing credit operations by L im a’s merchants and intermediate 
traders with the new mining centers should have immediately relied on 
monopolistic and speculative practices. Although it is for the time being 
impossible to say w hether the trade liberalizations since the 1780’s 
brought about an overall decline of coercion in P eru ’s domestic trade 
patterns, it seems fairly clear that in the Andes no comparable cleavage 
of commercial practices between various social strata of the society 
developed.
The Bourbon reform s’ effect on commercial patterns was ambivalent 
and contradictory in both viceroyalties. O n the one hand there was 
growing competition, and free trade brought down the prices for 
European goods. At the same time the raised levels of taxation and the
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growing scarcity of coinage as a consequence of increased silver remit­
tance to the peninsula, made large sectors of the population ever more 
dependent on the small groups within late colonial society who were in a 
position to extend credit. In  this way the Bourbon reforms managed at 
once to threaten and strengthen the mercantile interests in New Spain 
and Peru.
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